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Information asymmetry of capital markets is observed on two levels of the market relations between the 
participants - between investors themselves and between investors and managers. The probability of informed trading is 
underlying the occurring asymmetry. Identification of the liaison between disclosure and information asymmetry is a 
transitive step to the review of the impact of information asymmetry on the corporate cost of capital. To evaluate the 
effect of the first two factors different correlations may be used; this specific research reviews liquidity of securities and 
estimation risk, which affect the corporate cost of capital. 
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Introduction  
Information asymmetry is a market friction, which occurs on the capital markets when one 
of the participants, upon conclusion of a transaction, has more information and is able to make more 
informed decision. Particularly, in securities trading, asymmetric information is available when 
either the buyer or the seller possess more information about past, present and future value of 
securities. Such situation offers to one or more investors who have access to insider information, 
better opportunity to gain profit from trading in securities and creates conditions for the occurrence 
of unfavourable choice. Abnormal imbalances occur on the securities market. This requires more 
profound analysis of the issue about how the created asymmetry may be impacted by disclosure on 
the part of the companies. The identification of the liaison between the quality of disclosure and the 
information asymmetry is of major significance for managers, investors, financial experts and 
regulatory authorities. This is a transitive step to the review of the influence of information 
asymmetry on the corporate cost of capital. Many researches have focussed on the relation between 
disclosures and information asymmetry and other on the effect of the level of information 
asymmetry on the cost of capital. Their aggregate review shows that disclosure is related to the cost 
of capital.  
This research focuses on studying the correlations between disclosure, information 
asymmetry and cost of capital. An overview has been made of the theoretical models and the 
empirical researches referring to the said aspects of the corporate markets of securities. The main 
task is to evaluate the correlation between the first two factors and their impact on the corporate 
cost of capital. It is important to note that this review has its limitation due to that most research 
papers in this area focus in countries with developed capital markets also chronologically covers a 
wide time range.  
 
1. Correlation between disclosure and information asymmetry. Probability of informed 
trading 
For the purpose of fair investment, companies should disclose both "the good" and "the bad" 
information. In the past selective disclosure used to be a serious problem for the investors because 
the so called insiders often made use of insider information for their own profit as opposed to 
investors who had access only to public information. Disclosure of information is an efficient way 
to influence the investors upon their attempt to find difficult to access public information.  In this 
context according to Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) disclosure contributes to reducing expenses 
ensuing from information asymmetry and is considered a factor for making strategic corporate 
decision to reduce information asymmetry. Particularly, they consider that disclosure reduces the 
opportunity for a specific investor to benefit from and receive other additional information. 
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Zagaglia (2013) discusses the probability of informed trading, the underlying factor for 
which is the information asymmetry. He examines its relation with the determinants of the return on 
securities. Since the realization of informed trading depends on the initiated transactions on the 
market in trading hours of a specific day, the research discusses the whole operating cycle - from 
the moment when data processing starts in order to send an alert of the possibility for informed 
purchase and/ or sale to estimation of the price parameters for the theoretical model laid down in the 
research. Generally the model is extrapolated by Glosten and Milgrom (1985). On microstructural 
level, the trade on the capital markets is reviewed as a game between the marker-makers and the 
investors who watch for new information or the lack of it in the beginning of the day. Thus, there 
are informed and non-informed investors on the market. Dealers on their part are not aware of the 
level of information of the investor they work with. It should be noted that for the investors "good" 
news presume higher return and "bad" news respectively lower return. Market-makers on their part 
determine the bid price and the ask price and perform the transactions for the day.  The results from 
the research show that registration of an information event causes information asymmetry between 
the participants on the market because not all of them have equal access to information. The 
availability of specific information may have different effect on the expected level of return on 
securities for a specific investor depending on how such investor assesses the disclosed data. 
Receiving "good" or "bad" news by the investors offers opportunity for performance of informed 
trading.  
informed trading, which represents a measure of the extent of information asymmetry, in two parts - 
informed trading on the basis of "good" news and on the basis of "bad" news. Asymmetry is 
analysed by evaluating insider information in the two specified cases, where authors are motivated 
by the arguments that investors are rather interested in informed sale when the bid price of 
securities has decreased than in informed purchase of securities which price has increased. Results 
show that receiving bad news to a greater extent affects the cost of equity capital while the effect 
from distributing good news is very low and statistically insignificant. 
 
2. Effect of information asymmetry and disclosure on cost of capital  
The first group of researches on the influence of information asymmetry, particularly 
disclosure of information, on the corporate cost of capital, is developed along the following lines: 
disclosure increases market liquidity, thus the cost of equity capital is reduced through lower 
transaction costs and higher demand for shares of the company. Researches confirm the statement 
that investors pay more for securities with high transaction costs, which provides for higher cost of 
equity capital. Many authors correlate the higher transaction costs with the information asymmetry 
and/or market non-liquidity.  
One of the first researchers developing hypotheses in this field is Demsetz (1968) who 
analyses the transaction costs on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). He evaluates what exactly 
they include and how the possession of information may cause their decrease and therefore decrease 
of the cost of capital.  
In his research Botosan (2000) uses the following diagram illustrating the benefits from the 
increased level of disclosure. (cf. Fig. 1) 
The left part of the diagram shows the effect from the higher level of disclosure according to 
which the company may achieve lower cost of equity capital by reducing the estimation risk1  of 
investors. If the information flow is limited, investors will be more uncertain about the estimated 
cash flow. Therefore, the sources of the capital (in this case investors) will require higher return 
especially if "the information risk" may not be limited.  
The right part shows that, according to Botosan, the reduced level of information differences 
between investors creates higher liquidity of securities, which on its part results in reducing the cost 
                                                 
1 The estimation risk refers to uncertainty of investors about the parameters of the return on securities. 
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of capital. The higher liquidity reduces the average transactions costs and allows that the value of 
securities reaches higher level.   
 
 
Fig. 1. Correlation between public disclosure and cost of equity capital 
 
It is considered that there is a negative correlation between the cost of equity capital and the 
extent of disclosure. According to the Botosan's research, for companies with more transparent 
policy, the margin of the cost of equity capital may result in decrease of the transaction costs by up 
to 9% (if such companies are not subject to big analyst following). Further it must be noted that the 
research is limited because it includes companies from one sector only - the industry sector and the 
data cover only a one-year period.  
The paragraphs below examine in details the two parameters specified by Botosan in 
connection with their impact on the corporate cost of capital. 
 
2.1. Role of liquidity  
Market liquidity is defined as the possibility for fast transformation of an asset into cash, 
and vice versa, without causing a drastic change in the asset's price and additional transaction costs.  
Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) establish the correlation between the need of liquidity on the 
capital markets, the optimum level of disclosure, the cost of capital, the intermediation costs and the 
informed trading. The choice for disclosure process depends on the liquidity needs of the company 
at a time. The higher level of disclosure reduces the profits of the managers from the so called 
informed trading and the costs connected with the payment of the concerned managers. The cost of 
capital also decreases due to the increased liquidity, which promotes investments by persons aiming 
to get quick cash turnover in future. 
Bagehot (1971) considers that the managers on the financial markets face two types of 
investors, the first type being investors possessing insider information or the so called "informed 
investors". They possess information, which are not publicly disclosed and it enables them make 
 Increased level of public 
information disclosure 
Reducing the level of information 
asymmetry between managers and 
investors 
Reducing the level of information 
asymmetry between investors 
Reducing the estimation risk Increasing the market liquidity of 
securities 
Reducing the cost of equity capital 
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better estimation of the future value of securities. The informed investor may trade this information 
in order to increase the value of shares and respectively the return on securities. However, in this 
case the return will increase insignificantly due to the existence of a wide spread between the 
dealer's ask price and the investor's bid price. Upon conclusion of transactions between an informed 
investor and a dealer the latter may realize profit only if the investor fails to assess correctly the 
information, which it possesses. According to Bagehot it is clear that, in a case like that, "informed" 
investors play with the market makers the game "Heads I win, tails you lose"2. The created 
asymmetry of information causes an increase of the bid-ask spread, which results in reducing the 
liquidity of securities. The reduced liquidity increases the cost of equity capital.  
Copeland and Galai (1983) direct their analyses on the effect of the information regarding 
the bid-ask spread. As a key parameter of their research they propose the current "real" price of the 
security received from the market-maker3. The dealer undertakes to buy a fixed quantity of stock at 
specific ask price or to sell them at specific price. Such undertaking may be valid for a very short 
period and may be terminated for the next transaction or upon receipt of new information. The 
authors describe the process of receiving information and the response of the dealers as follows: 
information goes to the one who is first on the market. The market maker limits the size of its 
commitment for each offer in order to reduce any potential loss from a better informed investor. 
After each transaction, any "private" information would be disclosed publicly and the dealer may 
reassess "the real" value of the security. The following limitation however applies here i.e. that the 
level of obtaining information is independent of the stochastic process which inherently induces 
changes in the prices of securities. This process of obtaining information could be considered from 
two aspects  continuous-time and discrete-time stochastic process. Copeland and Galai review the 
process of obtaining information in its two directions and specify its effect on the bid-ask spread. 
This results in expansion and even maximization of the spread on the part of the dealer who is thus 
trying to balance the estimated income gained by investors seeking liquidity and the possible loss 
from investors possessing more information.  
The model presented by Copeland and Galai shows how the information reaching the 
participants in transactions on the financial markets may result in increase of the spread between the 
ask price and the bid price, which in its part results in reducing the liquidity of the market of 
securities. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) develop similar approach on which basis the market makers 
form a positive spread in order to generate profit from non-informed investors on whose account 
they may cover losses from transactions with informed investors.  
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) also published their research in this regard, which says that 
existence of investors possessing insider information results in positive ask-bid spread even if the 
dealer is risk neutral and expects zero profit. They present a model of the market of securities where 
receiving information with traders is carried out through an intermediary (dealer). The unfavourable 
choice on its own presumes existence of a spread between the ask price and the bid price and the 
average value of spread depends on a number of factors i.e. the method of receiving information 
with insiders and with those investors who have access only to public information, elasticity of 
demand and supply among traders, the quality of information from insiders. The above listed 
contribute to the development of information asymmetry which results in increasing the value of 
spread and therefore reducing the liquidity of securities and increasing the price of financing. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) also state that the cost of equity capital is higher for 
securities with wider ask-bid spread. Particularly they consider the effect of spread on the expected 
return. Their model presents a market on which rational traders differ in terms of their expectations 
                                                 
2 The English idiom Heads I win, tails you lose said about a situation in which you will win whatever happens 
(translation from Cambridge Advanced Learner  
3 Demsetz (1968) defines "the real" price as the equilibrium price which would exist in a world without threats of sharp 
changes and in which all participants in the transaction are equally informed. 
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and thus assets have different spreads. Two years later the same researchers publish another work in 
which they expand the concept for disclosure of information and recommend that the financial 
managers in the companies provide additional data in order to reduce the ask-bid spread and 
therefore to increase the liquidity on the market and decrease the cost of the capital, respectively. 
According to the empirical research of Sarin, Shastri and Shastri (2000) individuals who 
have access to insider information are much better informed than other shareholders and this affects 
the spread in ascending direction and therefore has a negative effect on liquidity of securities. 
The reviewed researches are reduced to the statement that disclosure of information for the 
purpose of reducing the information asymmetry may decrease the cost of equity capital. This result 
is a consequence of the increased level of liquidity of securities, which increases the demand on the 
part of investors.  
 
2.2. Effect of estimation risk  
The second flow of researches shows that the higher level of disclosure mitigates the 
estimation risk ensuing from the assessments of the investors about the parameters of the return on 
asset.  
The economic literature characterizes the estimation risk as an additional element of the risk, 
which arises due to the uncertainty of the investors about the parameters of return of the securities 
or profit distribution. Investors evaluate the return on the basis of the information they possess and 
therefore the level of certainty depends on the way by which data are distributed and evaluated. The 
theories here come to two conclusions very important for disclosure of information. The first 
conclusion is that the estimation risk is a systematic (market) risk so that the cost of equity capital is 
higher for securities with low degree of disclosed information about them. Secondly, analysts of the 
theories for the optimum portfolio and equilibrium pricing ignore the estimation risk by assuming 
that the expected risk parameters are true without taking into account that they may change or don't 
have the expected effect.  
The main idea underlying the last aspect may be described through the following simplified 
example: Two companies (A and B) have the same expectations about return but differ depending 
on the quality of information possessed by investors. Investors are certain about the future return of 
company A because they have sufficient information available about the company. For company B 
however scanty information is available and therefore the investors are not completely certain in 
their expectations for future return. The capital assets pricing model (CAPM) accepts the expected 
return for both companies as "true" and ignores the uncertainty of investors with regard to their 
different expectations. With a view to that CAPM does not take into account the uncertainty of the 
expectations of the investors when calculating the optimum portfolio or the equilibrium pricing of 
securities.  
Adequate assets pricing requires that the uncertainty of investors is explicitly taken into 
account where the securities with higher estimation risk must have lower real value. Estimation risk 
must be considered as a part of the market beta coefficient (systematic risk).  
Klein and Bawa (1976) consider the effect of the estimation risk on the choice of optimum 
portfolio considering the uncertainty. They establish that in the real situations, the parameters of 
return are not well studied and known and are measured on the basis of the available economic data. 
As it was already mentioned, analyses then performed neglect the estimation risk and accept the 
parameters for return as sufficiently true in order to make optimum choice of portfolio. Klein and 
Bawa conclude that insufficient information affects the estimation risk and should be a mandatory 
element upon calculating the parameters of return on securities.  
In their research Barry and Brown (1985) propose a simplified model to measure the 
equilibrium price of an asset for which investors have different access to insider information. Based 
on this assumption, authors develop variants concerning the parameters of return on alternative 
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securities. They demonstrate that uncertainty of investors or estimation risk may impact the market 
equilibrium. All other things being equal, securities for which less information is available bring 
higher systematic risk if risk is measured correctly.   
asset prices. They review publications made at that time, which consider that when information is 
absolutely equal for all market participants and the estimation risk is equal for all securities, then 
the concerned uncertainty is irrelevant for equilibrium. Along these lines, their result show another 
trend i.e. that the equal values of risk estimation do not affect equally the stock prices upon 
equilibrium, the expected return, the market weights and the market beta coefficients.  Therefore the 
effect of "the uncertainty" on the investors is of major importance when measuring the price of 
assets and respectively the corporate cost of capital.  
The above is supported also by the publication of Coles and Loewenstein (1995) according 
to which the developments with regard to estimation risk made until then by the other researchers 
were limited in the model of return to a specific period, where the investors must calculate the 
expected return but the co-variation matrix4 is known to them. Two researchers analyse the 
asymmetric parameters of uncertainty in a model based on the estimated return for the investors. By 
this model they analyse how the symmetrical and non-symmetrical estimation risk affect the 
equilibrium asset value. They also analyse the effects of asymmetric parameters on the uncertainty 
for more than one period. The results support the theories of Barry and Brown and show that the 
securities with higher extent of disclosed information about them in specific period of time have 
lower beta coefficient of systematic risk. However, as regards researches covering multiple periods, 
the estimated return on securities with insufficient information should reduce their values due to 
subsequent analyses and observations, which will be carried out by the financial experts.    
For each asset in economy different information may be available. Its impact on the value of 
assets may be assessed also through the Arbitrage pricing theory 5, which is an alternative to 
CAPM. According to this theory, investors use the existing information when they measure the 
estimated return on a portfolio of assets. Such measurements of return are linearly dependent on the 
totality of beta coefficients, which reflect different aspects of the systematic risk. It may be 
expected that the beta coefficients and the prices of assets are different depending on the degree of 
disclosure. For assets with higher extent of disclosure, the prices of stock will be higher and the beta 
coefficients will be lower. In this respect, Handa and Linn (1993) determine the need of reviewing 
and testing the Arbitrage Pricing Theory in the cases when investors don't have the whole available 
information about the parameters generating return on assets. In their research work they review the 
maximum possible value of the beta coefficients as too high for assets with disclosed information. 
In their model, investors may not ignore the estimation risk, which affects the beta coefficient and 
consequently the price of the asset. Handa and Linn establish by their research that when there are 
information differences, the prices of assets are higher for assets for which more information is 
disclosed than for the remaining. The opposite is valid for beta coefficients. The main conclusion 
here, as in the previous statements, is that the return correlates with the specified parameters for 
measuring the information. In addition to their conclusions it may be noted that, by using the 
                                                 
4  In the statistics the covariation matrix is a regression method for measuring the interdependence between the specified 
number of set parameters and is calculated for each component of the matrix. Variation - covariation matrix is a square 
matrix containing variations and co-variations interconnected with a few variables. The diagonal elements of the matrix 
contain the deviations of the variables and the non-diagonal elements represent covariations between all possible pairs 
of variables. 
5 Arbitrage pricing theory APT was developed by Stephen Ross from the University of Yale in 1976 as an alternative 
model for measurement of assets. APT divides the systematic risk into smaller components but it does not specify them 
initially.. Generally each factor that may influence the return on a group of assets is defined. According to the theory the 
return depends on four key factors: a) inflation rate; b) industrial production; c) willingness of the investor to assume 
risk; d) interest rate. According to APT the estimated return on a share is proportionate to its sensitivity to all these 
factors. 
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method of maximum plausibility 6 for measuring the beta coefficients, the risk is underestimated for 
securities with low level of disclosed information and overestimated for securities with high extent 
of disclosed information.  
Another similar research is the one of Clarkson, Guedes and Thompson (1996). They focus 
their attention on how the relation between risk and return on securities is influenced by the 
uncertainty of the investors concerning the parameters of return. First, they review the 
diversification by focusing on the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, just like Handa and Linn. Second, they 
focus their observations on the estimation risk and describe models for experimental studies, which 
shall include the existence of estimation risk and show it in the results. And third, they propose 
simultaneous monitoring of securities for which much information is disclosed and securities with 
less data provided in order to contribute to the process of measuring the parameters of return on 
securities with lower degree of information publicity. Clarkson, Guedes and Thompson conclude 
that the estimation risk must be taken into account when examining  the information asymmetry 
between investors. By influencing the effect from the estimation risk, the cost of capital may be 
influenced too.  
In 2004, Easley and O'Hara examine more thoroughly the impact of the information 
asymmetry on the cost of the equity capital. They define a few parameters of the information: the 
ratio of non-public disclosed information to the disclosed one, dispersion of non-public information 
among traders, the precision/ accuracy of the composition of publicly disclosed and insider 
information. This model is focused on non-informed investors who seek higher return in order to 
hold specific shares, which may compensate the possible losses from the so called "informed 
investors". This is because investors possessing insider information would change their portfolio 
according to the new data and the other investors don't have such advantage and "insure" 
themselves by using other means. Although, non-informed investors are not able to obtain directly 
additional information, which the other investors possess, the may partially identify it in the prices 
of securities. Also investors pursue such securities for which they know enough and are additionally 
informed. In such case, investors that are not well informed seek higher return and therefore the cost 
of equity capital of companies with higher percentage of non-publicly disclosed information is 
higher. However, if insider information is dispersed in a wider range, more investors would demand 
the securities. That would reduce the cost of the equity capital due to the higher demand. In 
addition, it should be noted that when the insider information is widely dispersed, it is retained in 
the price of the stock with higher accuracy. This again results in decrease of the cost of equity 
capital because non-informed investors will reduce their requirements for additional return. And the 
third and last factor indicated by the two researchers, shows that the higher is the precision of the 
combination between public and insider information, the lower is the price of financing using equity 
capital. In conclusion Easley and O'Hara state how the cost of capital could be influenced - by 
applying specific financial and accounting procedures, analysing more thoroughly the market 
microstructure and the capital market. 
Hail (2002) also presents his opinion on the correlation between disclosure and the cost of 
equity capital. The most important and first clarification in the research is that neither disclosure of 
information nor the cost of capital may be directly measured and the return on equity capital shall 
be used for determining the cost of capital. His research is based on data from 73 non-financial 
companies in Switzerland. This country was chosen because at that time the Swiss companies had 
significant freedom of reporting financial data and the prescriptions for disclosure were not so much 
increased. The obtained results confirm the hypothesis for negative correlation between disclosure 
and cost of equity capital. 
Petrova et al. (2012) also support the last statement by making detailed analysis of 121 
Swiss companies listed on the stock exchange. Companies may reduce the cost of equity capital by 
                                                 
6 Method of maximum plausibility - method of the mathematical statistics to design score assessments (or more 
explicitly to find assessment of the parameters of distribution of a random value).  
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voluntary disclosure of information. The obtained results are valid even if taking into account the 
impact of different specific risks such as size of company, financial leverage, and irrespective of the 
corporate strategy for transparency and financial reporting.  
Saini and Herrmann (2012) review the issue about how by disclosing information by 
segments of the company's business may be influenced the information of the investors and confirm 
the inverse relationship between the cost of equity capital and the level of disclosure. This negative 
correlation means that the higher level of disclosure by segments of the company's business is 
evaluated by the investors and is proven by the reduced cost of capital. The higher level of 
information of specific investors corresponds to the high level of asymmetry and therefore to the 
higher cost of capital. The obtained results give ground to conclude that when determining the rules 
for reporting the company's business by segments, informed investors and level of information 
asymmetry shall be taken into account. Authors consider this important because they find that the 
correlation between the cost of the company and the level of disclosure by segments is stronger 
when there is higher asymmetry among investors. 
 
Conclusion  
Based on the numerous researches on the correlation between disclosure and cost of equity 
capital it may be summarized that, all other things being equal, investors prefer securities with low 
estimation risk, low transaction costs and/or lower degree of information asymmetry. Since demand 
of securities with such characteristics is higher, the stock prices are also higher and therefore the 
cost of equity capital is lower for such companies. If disclosure reduces the estimation risk, the 
transaction costs and the information asymmetry, then it can be concluded that there is a negative 
correlation between additional disclosures and cost of equity capital. Based on the literature review 
of the specified parameters and the phenomena on the capital market, the following dependencies 
are identified: negative correlation between disclosure and information asymmetry; positive 
correlation between level of information asymmetry and cost of capital and inverse relationship 
between disclosure of information and cost of capital.  
Given the constraints of this review paper, it should be noted that its conclusions are not 
categorical and do not claim to be fully comprehensive and unconditional.   
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